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Abstract : In China–Audiovisuals, a series of Chinese restrictions on the
importation and distribution of certain ‘cultural ’ or ‘content’ goods and services
were found to violate GATT, GATS, and China’s Accession Protocol. This paper
reviews the deﬁnition of what is a ‘good’ (is a ‘ﬁlm’ a good or a service?) and
the extent to which GATT Article XX exceptions can justify violations under
WTO instruments other than the GATT itself. We argue that trade volumes are
unlikely to signiﬁcantly rise as a result of this ruling as it does not aﬀect China’s
right to keep out foreign ﬁlms and publications if China ﬁnds them objectionable.
However, foreign producers of audiovisuals can now gain potentially large
economic rents, by being able to export and distribute their products into the
Chinese market. Finally, we discuss the issue of the protection of cultural goods
and review the recent literature on trade and culture that has put forward
economic arguments to justify, under some conditions, the protection of cultural
goods.
Summary of the dispute
China–Audiovisuals1 is a complex and broad-based dispute ﬁled by the United
States in April 2007 against a series of Chinese restrictions on the importation
and distribution of certain ‘cultural ’ or ‘content’ goods and services : (i) reading
materials such as books, periodicals, and electronic publications; (ii) audiovisual
home-entertainment products such as DVDs; (iii) sound recordings; and (iv) ﬁlms
for theatrical release. More particularly, the dispute concerns problems faced by
the US ‘content ’ industry trying to obtain the right to import and distribute within
China on a nondiscriminatory basis. This dispute is closely related to the one on
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1 Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Aﬀecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for
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China–IP Rights2 where the issue at stake was the protection and enforcement
within China of intellectual property rights, in particular copyrights, linked to
cultural goods and services. Indeed, the United States argued that the fact that
China was controlling which companies could import audiovisual items and which
ones could distribute these items raised prices and opened up the market to piracy
and counterfeits.
As a preliminary matter, the Panel found that certain measures and products
complained about fell outside its terms of reference. The Chinese measures it did
examine, however, were almost all (15 out of 17 measures3) found to violate one or
more of the following WTO commitments : (i) China’s commitment to grant
the right to trade (in particular, import) to all enterprises in China including
foreign-invested enterprises and individuals, under China’s Protocol of Accession;
(ii) GATS market-access and national-treatment obligations towards foreign (US)
suppliers of distribution services operating within China; and (iii) GATT national
treatment in respect of measures that aﬀect the distribution of imported reading
materials.
The Panel Report was circulated in August 2009. Most Panel ﬁndings were not
appealed. China only appealed three elements. First, it appealed the Panel’s ﬁnding
that China’s trading-rights commitments apply to Chinese measures concerning
ﬁlms for theatrical release and unﬁnished audiovisual products, on the ground
that, according to China, these measures regulate ‘services ’ and content, not
‘goods’. Second, China appealed the Panel’s analysis and conclusion under GATT
Article XX(a) (public morals), an exception that China had unsuccessfully invoked
to justify violations of its Accession Protocol with reference to China’s censorship
regime allegedly imposed to protect public morals against sensitive cultural
imports.4 Third, China appealed the Panel’s ﬁnding that ‘Sound recording distri-
bution services ’ in China’s GATS Schedule cover the electronic distribution of
sound recordings in nonphysical form, notably over the Internet. The Appellate
Body upheld all of the Panel’s conclusions and conﬁrmed that China had violated
its Protocol of Accession in a way that cannot be justiﬁed under GATT Article
XX(a). The Appellate Body also conﬁrmed the Panel’s ﬁndings of GATS violation.
The Panel’s ﬁndings of violation under GATT had not been appealed. Both the
Panel and the Appellate Body Reports were adopted by the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body on 19 January 2010.
In what follows, we discuss what we believe to be the most interesting
legal and economic issues raised by the Appellate Body’s ruling on
2 Panel Report, China – Measures Aﬀecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, WT/DS362/R, adopted 20 March 2009.
3 Appellate Body Report, China–Audiovisuals, paras. 129–130.
4 In this respect, the United States also ﬁled an appeal against an intermediate ﬁnding by the Panel that
one of China’s restrictions (the so-called ‘State plan requirement’) can be seen as ‘necessary’ to protect
public morals in China (even if the Panel ultimately found that this was not the case).
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China–Audiovisuals.5 The legal analysis is divided in two parts. First, we review
the Appellate Body’s approach to, and deﬁnition of, what is a ‘good’ (is a ‘ﬁlm’ a
good or a service?). Second, we discuss the extent to which GATT Article XX
exceptions can justify violations under WTO agreements or instruments other
than the GATT itself. In this case, China was allowed to invoke ‘public morals’
under GATT Article XX(a) to justify violations under its Protocol of Accession.
In future cases, the issue may well be whether a health or environmental
regulation, anti-dumping duty, safeguard, or subsidy that violates the SPS, TBT,
AD, SG, or SCM agreement can be justiﬁed under GATT Article XX (or XXIV)
exceptions.
The economic analysis will also be divided in two parts. First, we review the
economic implications of the Appellate Body’s ruling in China–Audiovisuals. We
argue that trade volumes are unlikely to signiﬁcantly rise as a result of this ruling as
it does not aﬀect China’s right to keep out foreign ﬁlms and publications if China
ﬁnds them objectionable. However, foreign producers of audiovisuals can now
gain potentially large economic rents, by being able to export and distribute their
products into the Chinese market. Second, we discuss the issue of the protection of
cultural goods. In China–Audiovisuals, China argued that reading materials and
ﬁnished audiovisual products are so-called ‘cultural goods’ and as such have a
potentially serious negative impact on public morals. However, this dispute left
open the question of whether the protection of cultural goods can or should ac-
tually be justiﬁed under GATT/WTO rules. We brieﬂy review the recent literature
on trade and culture, which has put forward economic arguments to justify, under
some conditions, the protection of cultural goods.
1. Legal analysis
1.1 Is a ﬁlm a ‘good ’ or a ‘service ’?
In China–Audiovisuals, the United States invoked market-access and trading rights
under the GATT, GATS, and China’s Accession Protocol. It complained that
China’s distribution system discriminates imports as compared to domestic,
Chinese goods or service suppliers in violation of national treatment, a cornerstone
of both GATT and GATS agreements.6
Faced with such choice between GATT and GATS in the context of today’s
sophisticated ‘content’ industry that often has goods-and-services components
(a newspaper is made of paper, but its content is a bundle of services that are by far
the most important added value; moreover, newspapers can now also be read and
traded online), a question that arises is whether a product is a ‘good’ or a ‘service’
5 Parts of this contribution draw upon Pauwelyn (2010: 119), which includes a more expansive
discussion of the good versus service distinction with reference also to EU and US law.
6 See Broude and Hestermeyer (2009).
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and whether a particular measure is subject to the GATT as a restriction on trade
in goods or the GATS as a restriction on trade in services, or both. This classiﬁ-
cation may be rather academic in a legal system (such as the EU) where free
movement of goods and free movement of services are by now subject to more or
less the same commitments. In other situations, in contrast, the goods and the
services regimes may impose radically diﬀerent obligations. In such cases, drawing
the line between goods and services can make or break a dispute. This is the
situation in the WTO, where GATT is over 60 years old with a complete ban on
all quantitative restrictions and discriminatory regulations unless justiﬁed under
limited exceptions (in particular GATT Article XX). The GATS, in contrast, is
only 15 years old and composed mainly of country-speciﬁc commitments carefully
bound (or not bound, depending on the services sector in question) so that
national-treatment or market-access obligations only exist if and to the extent that
a particular member made a speciﬁc commitment for the particular sector in
question. These obligations are subject to general exceptions, particularly, in
GATS Article XIV, which is similar to GATT Article XX. A similarly divergent
regulation of goods as opposed to services can be found in anti-dumping rules. Such
rules permit the imposition of anti-dumping duties on imports of goods below fair
or normal value. In cases where an import is classiﬁed as a ‘service’ (instead of a
‘good’) no anti-dumping duties can be imposed.7
So how does the WTO proceed in its application of the GATT and/or the GATS
in situations of doubt? Firstly, and most importantly, nowhere does GATT deﬁne
what a ‘good’ or ‘product’ is. GATS, in turn, does not deﬁne the concept of a
‘service’ either. Instead, the GATT Secretariat issued an indicative list of service
activities or sectors that most WTO members have used as a template when
making GATS commitments.8 GATS Article I :1 does, however, state broadly that
it applies to any measure by any WTO member ‘aﬀecting’ trade in services.
Secondly, and largely as a consequence, in EC–Bananas the Appellate Body found
that the GATT and the GATS are not mutually exclusive so that one and the same
measure can be subject to both GATT and GATS.9 In Canada–Periodicals, for
example, the Appellate Body found that ‘a periodical is a good comprised of
two components : editorial content and advertising content. Both components
can be viewed as having services attributes, but they combine to form a physical
product – the periodical itself ’.10 In US–Lumber CVDs Final, the Appellate
Body found that standing timber, even before it is harvested (that is, trees
attached to the land but severable from it), is a ‘good’ even if it is not tradable as
7 The distinction between goods and services in the anti-dumping context was at the center of a recent
US Supreme Court opinion, United States v. Eurodif SA, 129 S. Ct. 878 (2009).
8 Services Sectoral Classiﬁcation List, GATT Document, MTN.GNS/W/120, 10 July 1991.
9 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (DSR 1997:II, 591), para. 221.
10 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R (DSR
1997:I, 449), p. 17.
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such.11 The Appellate Body rejected Canada’s argument that the term ‘goods’
must be read as limited to ‘tradable items with an actual or potential tariﬀ classi-
ﬁcation’12 but added that important caveat that ‘ ‘‘ [g]oods’’ in_ the SCM
Agreement and ‘‘products’’ in_ the GATT 1994 are diﬀerent words that need
not necessarily bear the same meanings in the diﬀerent contexts in which they are
used’.13
That set the stage for a jurisprudence that focuses on the measure in question
and whether it has an eﬀect or impact on trade in goods and/or services, with
physical or material nature being a decisive criterion for something to be a good.
China–Audiovisuals follows this line. In China, only certain state-approved
entities may engage in the business of importing ﬁlms into China. These entities
enter into a licensing or distribution agreement with a foreign-ﬁlm producer or
licensor and, after content review, import certain delivery materials including
hard-copy cinematographic ﬁlms. In paragraph 5.1 of its Accession Protocol,
however, China committed to phase out state trading three years after its accession
(with limited exceptions) and that, after three years, ‘all enterprises in China shall
have the right to trade in all goods throughout the customs territory of China’. The
Protocol deﬁnes the right to trade as ‘the right to import and export goods’.
According to China, this right to trade in goods does not apply to measures
pertaining to ﬁlms for theatrical release since such measures ‘do not regulate the
importation of goods, but, rather, regulate the content of ﬁlms and the services
associated with the importation of such content’.14 For China, ‘ﬁlms for theatrical
release are not goods because they are exploited through a series of services;
because the commercial value of ﬁlms for theatrical release lies in the revenue
generated by these services; and because the delivery materials containing the
content of ﬁlms are mere accessories of such services and have no commercial
value of their own’.15
In response, the United States argued that ‘ the vast majority of goods are
commercially exploited through a series of associated services and that China’s
argument would transform virtually all goods into services’.16 The United States
added that ‘Articles III :10 and IV of the GATT 1994, which deal with cinemato-
graphic ﬁlms, conﬁrm that ﬁlms for theatrical release are goods’.17 The United
States also referred to the international classiﬁcation of products under the
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System of the World Customs
11 Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R (DSR 2004:II, 571), para. 67.
12 Ibid., para. 61.
13 Ibid., para. 63.
14 Appellate Body Report, China–Audiovisuals, para. 169.
15 Ibid., para. 173.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
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Organization and China’s WTO Schedule of Concession for goods, both of which
contain a heading for ‘cinematographic ﬁlm’ with embedded content.
In line with the abovementioned focus on measures (and their eﬀect) rather
than products as such (is a ﬁlm a good or a service?), the Appellate Body focused
on the Chinese regulation setting out the restriction, including a detailed analysis
of the term ‘Dian Ying ’ used in that regulation and its English translation
(‘motion picture’). The Appellate Body concluded that ‘where the content of a ﬁlm
is carried by physical delivery materials, [the Chinese restriction] will inevitably
regulate who may import goods for the plain reason that the content of a ﬁlm is
expressed through, and embedded in, a physical good’.18 For the Appellate Body,
this eﬀect on goods (i.e. the physical ﬁlm reel that crosses the border) is ‘ inevitable,
rather than ‘‘ incidental ’’ ’ and ‘the mere fact that the import transaction involving
hard-copy cinematographic ﬁlms may not be the ‘‘essential feature’’ of the
exploitation of the relevant ﬁlm does not preclude the application of China’s
trading-rights commitments to the Film Regulation ’.19 The Appellate Body
reached the same conclusion in respect of restrictions on unﬁnished audiovisual
products or master copies to be used to publish and manufacture copies for sale in
China.20
Several lessons can be drawn from this ruling. First, the Appellate Body conﬁrms
that a given product can have both a goods and a services component and that a
given measure can be subject to both GATT and GATS where it ‘aﬀects ’ both
goods and services. The two universes are not mutually exclusive. Crucially, the
Appellate Body did not ﬁnd that a ﬁlm ‘is ’ a good, but rather that it has a good’s
‘component’ or ‘ includes’ a good, to the extent the ﬁlm is carried on a ﬁlm reel or
other physical material and that, as a result, a regulation which aﬀects such ﬁlm
‘inevitably’ aﬀects a good. This means that regulators, when enacting a rule,
must be aware that the new rule may have to comply with both GATT and GATS.
This approach cumulates WTO obligations and may not make it easier to ﬁgure
out which GATT or GATS discipline applies. The safest move may then be to
comply with the strictest discipline be it under GATT or GATS. For complainants,
including countries that want to challenge China’s censorship regime, this
approach is positive news: they do not have to limit themselves to GATT or GATS
claims; they can submit and prevail under both. For regulating countries, such
as China, the cumulative application of GATT and GATS is, obviously, less
appealing.
Second, as in Canada–Periodicals, the Appellate Body’s deﬁnition of a good
focuses on the tangible or material nature of the product, i.e. the ﬁlm reel or hard-
copy ﬁlms, and this irrespective of whether this tangible component represents
only a minor fraction of the value or economic reality of the product. This, in
18 Ibid., para. 188.
19 Ibid., para. 196.
20 Ibid., para. 204.
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turn, raises two questions. First, will the Appellate Body automatically ﬁnd a
good whenever it sees tangible material? Is, for example, a paper lottery ticket
automatically a good – so that cross-border restrictions on lottery activities aﬀect
trade in goods? – or merely an element in the supply of (lottery) services, making
the entire activity subject only to GATS? What about coins or paper money in the
context, for example, of allegations of currency undervaluation or subsidization?21
Would the Appellate Body consider paper money to be a ‘good’ provided by the
government (‘ﬁnancial contribution’) or rather as falling under the free movement
of capital and, therefore, neither subject to GATT/SCM nor GATS rules on free
movement of goods or services? What about paper carbon-emission allowances
or permits which, under EU law, companies can trade and must submit when
emitting CO2? Are these goods or services, or neither?22
A second question that arises from the Appellate Body’s focus on tangible
material is this : does it suﬃce for a traded product to be intangible for that product
to be regarded only as a service?23 For example, if US ﬁlm producers would stop
physically shipping ﬁlm reels or master copies to China for reproduction within
China, and rather send the material electronically over the Internet, would that
automatically imply that we can no longer talk of trade in goods and trading
rights, and must examine the transaction exclusively under GATS (say, as a cross-
border supply of ‘entertainment services ’)? If so, China would then no longer
violate its Accession Protocol (trading rights only apply in respect of goods) and
the United States would have to rely exclusively on, for example, Chinese GATS
commitments in entertainment or distribution services (which may well be below
China’s commitments in GATT). Should the mere method of delivery (tangible or
over the Internet) bring about this drastic change in legal regime? If so, the GATT
could be said to be technologically biased (unlike the GATS which, as discussed
below, is technologically neutral). Should the law follow economic reality
(in business terms little changes when sending the ﬁlm on a reel or over the
Internet, assuming the quality is the same), or should the law stick to physics
(tangible is GATT, intangible is GATS)? Making tangibility a necessary condition
for something to be a good may also mean that, for example, in the trade-in-energy
21 An unadopted GATT Panel found that gold coins are ‘products’ and that Canada violated national
treatment by imposing a retail tax on the South African Krugerrand which it was not imposing on the
Canadian Maple Leaf (Panel on Canada – Measures Aﬀecting the Sale of Gold Coins, L/5863, 1985).
22 Note, in this respect, that the Appellate Body in Canada–Lumber CVDs Final, para. 66, found that
standing timber is a ‘good’ even if ‘speciﬁc trees’ are not ‘ identiﬁed’ in stumpage contracts: ‘we do not see
the relevance, for an assessment of whether trees are goods, of the fact that each individual tree within the
speciﬁed area of land covered by a stumpage contract may not be identiﬁed at the time the contract is
made_We see no reason why disciplines on subsidies that regulate the provision of non-monetary re-
sources should focus on identiﬁable physical objects and not on tangible, but fungible, input material ’
(underlining added).
23 Note, in this respect, that the Appellate Body in Canada–Lumber CVDs Final, para. 59, found that
‘the ordinary meaning of the term ‘‘goods’’ [in the SCM Agreement]_ includes items that are tangible
and capable of being possessed’ (emphasis added). This could hint at the universe of goods being broader
than just tangible products.
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context electricity cannot be classiﬁed as a good. Similarly, is a carbon-emissions
allowance a good as long as it is traded in paper form or suﬃciently linked to a
‘tangible, but fungible, input material ’24 (e.g., carbon emitted during production),
but does it become a service, or otherwise stop being a good, when traded and
registered electronically? The same conclusion could then be drawn in respect of
intellectual property rights – which are intangible and arguably, on that basis, not
a good – and this even though they are now commonly protected as ‘assets ’ or
‘ investments’ under bilateral investment treaties and the IP value (e.g., copyright)
of a ﬁlm is by far the most valuable component of the ﬁlm. In contrast, if IP rights
as such were to be seen as ‘goods’, major questions of GATT-TRIPS overlap
would arise.
Interestingly, when interpreting the phrase ‘[s]ound recording distribution
services ’ in China’s GATS Schedule, the Appellate Body found that this includes
not only distribution of tangible products (such as CDs) as China had argued, but
also distribution of intangibles over the Internet, as submitted by the United
States.25 It did so based on a textual and contextual interpretation of the words
in this phrase, rather than with reference to broader criteria of ‘services’ or ‘goods’
deﬁnitions. Crucially, the Appellate Body conﬁrmed its evolutionary approach to
treaty interpretation, ﬁnding that the terms in China’s GATS Schedule ‘are suﬃ-
ciently generic that what they apply to may change over time’,26 and that limiting
their meaning to ‘the time the Schedule was concluded’ would mean that ‘very
similar or identically worded commitments could be given diﬀerent mean-
ings_ depending on the date of their adoption’, which would ‘undermine the
predictability, security, and clarity of GATS’.27
As a result, it is interesting to point out that the Appellate Body interpreted
services commitments in a technologically neutral way (distribution covers
both old-style physical delivery and new-style delivery over the Internet, unless
otherwise speciﬁed), but limited goods commitments and the right to import goods
to restrictions aﬀecting material or tangible products (thereby, as noted earlier,
apparently excluding ﬁlms traded intangibly over the Internet). In other words,
method of delivery (tangible or over the Internet) matters for goods, but not for
services. In this sense, GATS is technologically neutral, GATT technologically
biased.
From an economic perspective, it should be pointed out that the ﬁne legal dis-
tinctions made in the WTO between goods and services, and the often crucial
regulatory consequences that come with it, ﬁnd little or no support in the economic
literature. In general, there should be no reason why basic trade eﬀects and welfare
24 See footnote 22 above.
25 Appellate Body Report, China–Audiovisuals, para. 412.
26 Ibid., para. 396.
27 Ibid., para. 397.
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calculations should apply diﬀerently to, for example, tangible versus intangible
products or to distribution by mail or over the Internet.
1.2 Can GATT exceptions justify breach under all WTO agreements?
Important issues are raised by the ﬁnding of the Appellate Body that a GATT
exception can, in principle, justify a violation of China’s Accession Protocol.
Interestingly enough, in China–Audiovisuals, China did not invoke any GATS or
GATT exception to justify the abovementioned GATS and GATT violations
found by the Panel (but not appealed). In particular, although it could have done
so, China did not invoke ‘public morals’ so as to justify some of these violations
with reference to its censorship regime. In contrast, China did invoke GATT art.
XX(a) (‘public morals’) to justify certain (but not all) restrictions on trading rights
found to be in violation of China’s Accession Protocol.28
GATT Article XX is entitled ‘General Exceptions’ and states that ‘nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement’ of
certain measures, including those ‘necessary to protect public morals ’. Paragraph
5.1 of China’s Accession Protocol, in turn, explicitly states that the right to trade
that China committed to is ‘[w]ithout prejudice to China’s right to regulate trade
in a manner consistent with theWTOAgreement’. For GATT Article XX to justify
a Protocol breach raises two hurdles. First, given that Article XX explicitly
refers back to ‘nothing in this Agreement’, i.e. GATT, how can Article XX
justify breaches outside the GATT? Second, and related, given that the Appellate
Body had not made any prior ﬁnding of violation under GATT (say, a national-
treatment violation under GATT Article III) how could China even rely on, or the
Panel turn to, GATT Article XX exceptions?
The Appellate Body skillfully jumped over both hurdles. It found that China’s
obligation to grant the ‘right to trade’ under the Protocol may not impair China’s
‘right to regulate trade’ in the sense of both (i) measures that other WTO agree-
ments ‘aﬃrmatively recognize’ provided they ‘satisfy prescribed disciplines and
meet speciﬁed conditions’ (think of WTO-consistent import licensing, TBT, or SPS
measures), and (ii) regulatory action that derogates from WTO obligations but
‘may be justiﬁed under an applicable exception’.29 For the Appellate Body, the fact
that the United States had not made a claim of violation under GATT to begin with
(it only claimed a violation of the Protocol) should not ‘deny China access to a
defence’. What matters, according to the Appellate Body, is the existence of a
‘clearly discernable, objective link’ or relationship between (i) the restriction on
who may trade (breach of the right to trade) and (ii) China’s regulation of what
28 Panel Report, China – Measures Aﬀecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R, para. 4.112.
29 Appellate Body Report, China–Audiovisuals, para. 223.
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may be traded (China’s right to regulate trade).30 Since the regulation of trade
or what can be traded (here, content review) may restrict or require regulation
of who may import or trade (here, only selected state enterprises), the Appellate
Body found that China’s breach of the right to trade under the Protocol
could possibly be justiﬁed by China’s right to regulate trade pursuant to GATT
Article XX(a).
This approach raises a fundamental question of WTO law. Must the ‘right to
regulate trade’ as a possible defense be explicitly provided for in the violated
provision that needs justiﬁcation? Put diﬀerently, would China have been able to
rely on GATT Article XX(a) even if paragraph 5.1 of China’s Accession Protocol
had not stated that the right to trade is ‘ [w]ithout prejudice to China’s right to
regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement’? The Appellate
Body’s close textual analysis of this phrase and its context in China’s Protocol may
lead some to conclude that without this savings clause, GATT Article XX(a)
would not have been available. On the other hand, one could argue that
adding this savings clause was not strictly necessary in the ﬁrst place and that all
WTO obligations must be interpreted in the context of a WTO member’s back-
ground or default ‘right to regulate trade consistent with the WTO Agreement’.
In this direction, the Appellate Body saw ‘the ‘‘right to regulate’’, in the abstract,
as an inherent power enjoyed by a Member’s government, rather than a
right bestowed by international treaties such as the WTO Agreement ’.31 On
this view, even without the savings clause in the Protocol, China could
have relied on its ‘ inherent power’ to regulate trade and, as a result, have
justiﬁed its breach with reference to GATT Article XX(a). If so, what matters is
not an explicit savings clause or reference back to GATT Article XX – nor the
fact that the text of GATT Article XX itself is limited to ‘this Agreement’
(i.e., GATT) – but that the trade restriction or WTO violation in question may,
as a regulatory or factual matter, result from, and be justiﬁed by, a GATT
Article XX type regulation to protect public morals, health, or the environ-
ment. This relates to what the Appellate Body referred to as the ‘clearly dis-
cernable, objective link’ between, on the one hand, the breach and, on the other
hand, a legitimate regulation of trade (consistent with speciﬁc WTO rules or ex-
ceptions).
That this question is of the utmost importance for WTO law is illustrated by
the following examples. Can an environmental subsidy inconsistent with the
SCM Agreement (be it a prohibited or actionable subsidy) on this ground be
justiﬁed under GATT Article XX(g) as a measure ‘relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources’? Similarly, can a health or safety restriction
30 Ibid., para. 230 (adding that this link must be ‘established through careful scrutiny of the nature,
design, structure, and function of the measure, often in conjunction with an examination of the regulatory
context within which it is situated’).
31 Appellate Body Report, China–Audiovisuals, para. 222.
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inconsistent with the SPS or TBT Agreement on this ground be excused as a ‘public
morals’ measure in line with GATT Article XX(a)?32 Can an anti-dumping duty
inconsistent with the AD Agreement be justiﬁed under GATT Article XX(d) as a
measure ‘necessary to ensure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with’ GATT?33 Can a safeguard that carves out regional partners in
violation of the Safeguards Agreement be justiﬁed under GATT Article XXIV al-
lowing for preferential agreements?34 Finally, can a measure in violation of TRIPS
be excused as the exercise of the right to regulate so as to protect health in line with
GATT Article XX(b)?
The above reasoning in China–Audiovisualsmay support such general, fall-back
right to regulate. Although these other WTO agreements do not include a general
‘without prejudice clause’ as set out in China’s Protocol, there is a clear, legal
relationship between these other agreements and GATT provisions (e.g., between
GATT Articles VI and XVI and the SCM and AD agreements; GATT Article XIX
and the Safeguards Agreement; GATT Article XX(b)/(g) and the SPS and TBT
agreements; and GATT Article XX(d) and TRIPS). Moreover, as a regulatory or
factual matter, there may also be a ‘discernable, objective link’ between the trade
restriction or breach and the exception invoked, in that the breach suﬃciently
relates to, or results from, a legitimate exercise of the right to regulate consistent
with other WTO rules or exceptions (the way Chinese censorship on what can be
traded may require restrictions on who can trade).
Such approach would certainly harness the regulatory autonomy of WTO
members. At the same time, it risks a considerable reduction of WTO obligations.
It would also create tension with the Appellate Body’s approach of applying WTO
32 In this respect, see Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Aﬀecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, Add.1 to Add.9, and Corr.1,
adopted 21 November 2006, DSR 2006:III–VIII, 847, which found that one single measure can be con-
sidered and justiﬁed under diﬀerent agreements so that even if it violates the SPS Agreement as a health
measure, it could still be justiﬁed under GATT Article XX(a) as a public-morals measure.
33 In United States – Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject to Anti-Dumping/
Countervailing Duties, WT/DS345/R, para. 310, the Appellate Body ‘assumed arguendo ’, without
deciding the matter, that a measure in violation with the AD Agreement can be justiﬁed under GATT
Article XX(d).
34 Note, in this respect, that the Appellate Body has found that the ‘unforeseen development’ con-
dition in GATT Article XIX, though not incorporated into the Safeguards Agreement, continues to apply
for safeguard measures to beWTO-consistent (Appellate Body Report on Argentina – SafeguardMeasures
on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R (DSR 2000:I, 515), para. 83: ‘Article XIX continues in full
force and eﬀect, and, in fact, establishes certain prerequisites for the imposition of safeguard measures’).
Although the Appellate Body has condemned members for having investigated all imports and then ap-
plying a safeguard only on imports from outside, for example, NAFTA or MERCOSUR (see, for example,
Appellate Body Report, United States – Deﬁnitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded
CarbonQuality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R, adopted 8March 2002), the Appellate Body has
so far not decided the question of whether investigating and applying a safeguard only against third
countries, in violation of Article 2 of the Safeguards Agreement, could be justiﬁed under GATT Article
XXIV.
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agreements and obligations cumulatively,35 as well as with the principle that, in the
event of conﬂict, GATT (including presumably GATT Article XX) must give way
to more specialized WTO agreements on trade in goods such as obligations in the
SCM, AD, SPS, or TBT agreements.36 Finally, allowing GATT Article XX to be
invoked to justify any WTO violation could well mean that any WTO dispute will
ultimately be decided on whether the measure is ‘necessary’ to pursue an Article
XX objective and nondiscriminatory under the chapeau of Article XX. This would
both confer considerable power and discretion to the Appellate Body in its
‘weighing and balancing exercise’ under Article XX as well as highlight the limited
list of objectives that can be pursued under Article XX (should, indeed, the fall-
back ‘right to regulate’ not extend beyond the exhaustive list of objectives men-
tioned in GATT Article XX, a provision written in 1947 essentially with quanti-
tative border restrictions in mind?).
From an economic perspective, if there are reasons to justify the use of protec-
tionist measures on the ground of environmental externalities (under the GATT
and Article XX), then similar arguments could in principle be used to justify ex-
ceptions when it comes to, for example, the use of subsidies (under the SCM
Agreement, where no environmental exception is available). Indeed, if tradition-
ally more harmful distortions such as a full ban on imports can be justiﬁed on
environmental grounds under GATT, why not the normally less harmful distortion
of a production subsidy under the SCM Agreement?
35 See, for example, Appellate Body Report on European Communities – Measures Aﬀecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (DSR 2001:VII, 3243), para. 80 (‘although the TBT
Agreement is intended to ‘further the objectives of GATT 1994’, it does so through a specialized legal
regime that applies solely to a limited class of measures. For these measures, the TBT Agreement imposes
obligations on Members that seem to be diﬀerent from, and additional to, the obligations imposed on
Members under the GATT 1994’ (underlining added). But see Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures
Aﬀecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R (DSR 1997:I, 167), adopted 20 March 1997, p. 14:
‘The relationship between the GATT 1994 and the other goods agreements in Annex 1A is complex and
must be examined on a case-by-case basis. Although the provisions of the GATT 1947 were incorporated
into, and became a part of the GATT 1994, they are not the sum total of the rights and obligations of
WTO Members concerning a particular matter. For example, with respect to subsidies on agricultural
products, Articles II, VI and XVI of the GATT 1994 alone do not represent the total rights and obligations
of WTOMembers. The Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM Agreement reﬂect the latest statement of
WTO Members as to their rights and obligations concerning agricultural subsidies. The general inter-
pretative note to Annex 1A was added to reﬂect that the other goods agreements in Annex 1A, in many
ways, represent a substantial elaboration of the provisions of the GATT 1994, and to the extent that the
provisions of the other goods agreements conﬂict with the provisions of the GATT 1994, the provisions of
the other goods agreements prevail. This does not mean, however, that the other goods agreements in
Annex 1A, such as the SCM Agreement, supersede the GATT 1994’ (underlining added).
36 See General interpretative note to Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement: ‘ In the event of conﬂict
between a provision of the [GATT 1994] and a provision of another agreement in Annex 1A to the
[WTO] Agreement_ the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conﬂict.’ The
question remains, of course, when there is such a ‘conﬂict’ and when exactly this lex specialis rule is
triggered.
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2. Economic analysis
In China–Audiovisuals, the United States has obtained certain rights to import and
distribute within China on a nondiscriminatory basis. In what follows, we brieﬂy
review the main economic implications of the Appellate Body’s ruling on this
dispute and discuss the economic arguments that could be used for the protection
of audiovisual products and other cultural goods.
2.1 Economic implications of the Appellate Body’s ruling
Audiovisuals have for the most part been excluded from the progress in trade
liberalization that has occurred in other sectors. Indeed, they are the object of an
explicit exception concerning internal ﬁlm quotas in Article IV of GATT 1994.37
Countries such as Korea, Brazil, Venezuela, Italy, and Spain, have taken advantage
of this exception to institute screening quotas for domestic (or EU) ﬁlm exhibition
(Bernier, 2003). Within China, there is a similar screening quota, pursuant to
which two-thirds of ﬁlms projected must be made in China.
In the case of China, foreign ﬁlms must, in addition, be deemed suitable for all
audiences. Under an elaborate censorship mechanism, China prohibits all content
that, in its view, would have a negative impact on ‘public morals ’. The list of
materials banned includes, for example, material that ‘ injures the national glory’,
‘undermines the solidarity of the nationalities ’, ‘propagates evil cults or super-
stition’, ‘destroys social stability’, or ‘ jeopardizes social morality or ﬁne cultural
traditions of the nationalities ’.38 For foreign-made ﬁlms, this sometimes means
controversial footage must be cut before such ﬁlms can play in Chinese cinemas.39
Regardless of the screening quota and the censorship, China permits only 20
foreign ﬁlms per year for theatrical release on a revenue-sharing basis (of which
14–16 are usually Hollywood releases).40 This means that only 20 foreign ﬁlms per
year get a (small) percentage of what they earn in the country instead of selling
distribution rights for a ﬂat fee.41
China’s internal screening quota, censorship policy, and quota on foreign
movies that can be imported on a revenue-sharing basis were not at issue in
37 Article IV of the GATT 1994 is an exception to Article III, which prohibits any form of discrimi-
nation between domestic and foreign products. It stipulates that a Member may maintain domestic quotas
including the obligation to show, for a speciﬁed amount of time, ﬁlms of domestic origin for a minimum
fraction of the overall time of projection actually used; however, it also speciﬁes that screen quotas remain
the subject of negotiations aiming to limit their scope or to eliminate them.
38 Panel Report, China–Audiovisuals, and Corr.1, para. 7.760.
39 An example is the removal of a footage that ‘viliﬁes and humiliates the Chinese’ in Pirates of the
Caribbean: At World’s End (BBC news, 12 June 2007).
40 The quota doubled in 2001 from the original ten in 1994, thanks to China’s WTO accession. Sector
2.D of China’s GATS Schedule reads: ‘China will allow the importation of motion pictures for theatrical
release on a revenue-sharing basis and the number of such imports shall be 20 on an annual basis. ’
41 The revenue-sharing deal is reportedly one of the worst in the world for ﬁlm studios. Foreign ﬁlms
earn about 13% of ticket sales in China (see http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0703/
miller.html (last visited 30 September 2010)).
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China–Audiovisuals. The dispute was instead over the fact that imported
audiovisual products could only be distributed by Chinese state-owned en-
terprises.42
China–Audiovisuals has been hailed as a big victory for US movie producers.
On the day when the Appellate Body Report was circulated, the US Trade
Representative Ron Kirk announced: ‘Today America got a big win_ The
Appellate Body’s ﬁndings are key to ensuring full market access in China for
legitimate, high-quality entertainment products and the exporters and distributors
of those products. ’43
Yet, the WTO ruling did not aﬀect China’s right to keep out foreign ﬁlms and
publications if it ﬁnds them objectionable. It also left in place the existing screening
and import quotas. Therefore, sales of US audiovisuals in China are unlikely
to increase as a result of this dispute. The WTO basically said that foreign audio-
visuals can no longer be distributed only by Chinese state-owned enterprises. This
implies that, even if market access is unaﬀected, foreign companies will be able
to earn potentially very large economic rents when now allowed to import and
distribute their entertainment products into the Chinese market.44 Distribution by
US companies (instead of Chinese state-owned companies) could also mean that
more Chinese consumers watch the (still limited amount of) US movies allowed
for screening in China. In other words, more transparent or eﬃcient distribution
may lead to more sales of particular imports that do pass China’s quotas and
censorship.
The Chinese government restricts the volume of cultural goods imported
through strict censorship and explicit import quotas. Both kinds of policies are
equivalent to quantitative restrictions of imports. In what follows, we examine the
economic implications of such restrictions, distinguishing between two scenarios:
(a) if China is a small country, i.e., takes the world price of cultural goods as given;
(b) if China is a large country, which can aﬀect the price of cultural goods in the
world market. In both scenarios, we examine the welfare eﬀects of a quantitative
restriction (compared to free trade) and discuss the implications of the Appellate
Body’s ruling in China–Audiovisuals.
42 In the case of ﬁlms, China Film Group and Huaxia Film Distribution Co. were the two state-owned
enterprises allowed to distribute foreign movies. China Film controlled most of the 20 import licenses. For
more details, see Jennifer M. Freedman, China Appeals WTO Ruling on Book, Film, Music Imports
(Update 3), BLOOMBERG.CO.JP, http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&tkr=DIS:US&
sid=aMgqddJ_22DQ (22 September 2009) (last visited 30 September 2010).
43 See press release of 21 December 2009, ‘WTO Appellate Body Conﬁrms Finding Against China’s
Treatment Of Certain Copyright-Intensive Products’, on http://www.ustr.gov (last visited 30 September
2010).
44 In addition, what used to be a discriminatory and opaque distribution network run by Chinese
state-enterprises should now be left to US companies or their aﬃliates themselves. This may mean that
even if the number of movies stays capped at 20, a more eﬃcient and competitive distribution network
may lead to more tickets sold per movie.
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Small-country case
Assume that China is a small country importing cultural goods and facing a world
price equal to pFT. At this price, domestic demand in China is given by DFT,
domestic supply by SFT, and imports by the diﬀerence DFT – SFT.
Now suppose that the Chinese government desires to reduce the volume of
cultural goods imported to an amountQ, which is below the free-trade level. It can
do so by censoring some foreign goods or by explicitly introducing an import
quota. The welfare eﬀects of a quantitative restriction on imports can be described
with the use of Figure 1. A reduction in imports will lower the supply in
the domestic market and raise the domestic price.45 In the new equilibrium, the
domestic price will rise to the level pQ, where import demand equals the value of
the quota, i.e.Q=DQ – SQ. Since the country is ‘small ’, there will be no eﬀect on
the world price, which will remain at pFT.
Table 1 provides a summary of the welfare eﬀects of the quota on cultural goods
on the Chinese economy compared to free trade. The left panel and right panel of
the table consider, respectively, the welfare implications of quantitative restric-
tions before and after the Appellate Body’s ruling on China–Audiovisuals. Notice
that, since quantitative restrictions on foreign cultural goods (through de facto
censorship quotas or import quotas) are still in place after the ruling, equilib-
rium quantities and prices are unaﬀected and so are Chinese consumers and
Figure 1.
DChina
SChina
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QChina
pFT
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SFT SQ DQ DFT
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D
45 Depending on the city and theater, movie-ticket prices in China currently range from ¥30 to ¥80
($3.90–$10). In 2006, China’s annual urban per capita disposable income hit $1,517, and the annual rural
per capita net income reached only $463, making a $10 ticket an expensive outing for most Chinese (see
http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0703/miller.html).
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producers: compared to free trade, consumers continue to experience a loss equiv-
alent to the area A+B+C+D, while producers continue to gain A. However, the
WTO ruling has a crucial impact on who receives the quota rents. These are given
by area C, which is equivalent to the domestic price of the imported good,minus the
world price, times the quantity of imports. Before the ruling, the permit to import
and distribute foreign cultural goods was given by the Chinese government to state-
owned companies ; after the ruling, such right will be given to foreign producers.
Compared to free trade, a quota on cultural goods unambiguously hurts the
Chinese economy. Compared to the previous policy regime, the Appellate Body’s
ruling on China–Audiovisuals leads to a net welfare loss for China, equivalent to
area C, and to a corresponding gain for the United States.
The above analysis of the economic implications of China–Audiovisuals could
have a potentially crucial impact on the calculation of US-authorized retaliation
in the event China does not implement the Appellate Body ruling within the
prescribed period. Traditionally, annual retaliation rights are set by the WTO at
the annual value of trade that is kept out by the WTO-inconsistent measure. In the
present case, China’s restriction on who may import is unlikely to impact the
amount of audiovisual products that can be imported, since this is limited by
government censorship (and, in the case of ﬁlms, by the quota of 20 foreign movies
on a revenue-sharing basis per year). Hence, there may be no trade value linked to
the violation. Yet, if welfare eﬀects were used to calculate retaliation rights, the
shift in quota rents could be used to ﬁx the ‘nulliﬁcation or impairment’ linked to
the violation and with it the authorized level of US retaliation.46
Large-country case
In our analysis above, we have examined the welfare implications of China’s
quantitative restrictions on cultural goods assuming that such restrictions have no
impact on world prices. However, with just over 1.3 billion people, China is the
world’s largest and most populous country, representing a full 20% of the world’s
population, and has thus the potential to aﬀect world prices in many sectors. As
shown below, this can change some of the welfare implications of its policies on
imported cultural goods.
Table 1. Welfare eﬀects of a quota on cultural goods compared to free trade
Before China–Audiovisuals After China–Audiovisuals
Consumer surplus x(A+B+C+D) x(A+B+C+D)
Producer surplus +A +A
Quota rents +C 0
National welfare x(B+D) x(B+C+D)
46 To this, one would then have to add any negative eﬀects linked to China’s discriminatory distri-
bution system (see Bown and Pauwelyn, 2010).
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To illustrate the large-country case, consider two trading countries, one im-
porting (China) and one exporting (United States) cultural goods. At the free-trade
equilibrium price, denoted by pFT, the excess demand by the importing country
equals excess supply by the exporter
DChina(pFT)xSChina(pFT)=SUS(pFT)xDUS(pFT)
Suppose now that China introduces a quantitative import restriction, allowing
only an amount Q of cultural goods to be imported from the United States. As a
result, the supply of cultural goods in the Chinese market will fall and, if the price
remained at pFT, there would be excess demand for these goods in the market. The
excess demand will induce an increase in the price ; in turn, this will reduce demand
and increase domestic supply causing a reduction in China’s import demand.
Since China is a ‘ large’ importer, the fall in its demand for cultural goods will
cause excess supply in the US market at the original price, leading to a reduction in
the US price. The lower price will, in turn, reduce US supply and raise US demand,
causing a reduction in US export supply. The price in China will rise to the level at
which import demand is equal to the quota level ; the price in the United States will
fall until export supply is equal to the quota level. A new equilibrium will be
reached when the following two conditions are satisﬁed
DChina(pChinaQ )xS
China(pChinaQ )=Q
SUS(pUSQ )xD
US(pUSQ )=Q
where pQ
China is the price in China after the quota, and pQ
US is the price in the US after
the quota. Figure 2 depicts the welfare eﬀects of the introduction of a quantitative
Figure 2.
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restriction on imports of cultural goods for the Chinese economy, while Table 2
distinguishes between the eﬀects on producers, consumers, and the government
(before and after the WTO ruling).
Notice that, in the large-country case, the quota rents gained by those
individuals or ﬁrms that are allowed to sell foreign cultural goods in China are
larger than in the small-country case (they are equal to C+G rather than C). As
discussed below, this implies that, if China is able to aﬀect world prices, the WTO
ruling leads to a larger loss in terms of quota rents for the Chinese government
(and to a correspondingly larger gain for US content producers).
The Appellate Body’s ruling in China–Audiovisuals implies that the quota rents
(C+G) are transferred from Chinese state-owned enterprises to foreign-content
producers. It is also interesting to compare Table 1 with Table 2 above. Notice
that, if China is able to aﬀect its terms of trade, the introduction of a quota on
cultural goods can potentially be beneﬁcial compared to free trade. However, for
this to be the case, the quota rents must be suﬃciently large (i.e. G must exceed
B+D) and the right to sell foreign cultural products must be given to Chinese
ﬁrms. This implies that, following the ruling on China–Audiovisuals, China would
unambiguously gain by removing restrictions on the number of foreign movies that
can be imported into its market. Of course, this assumes that the Chinese
government makes decisions with respect to cultural goods based on national
welfare rather than internal politics. That said, the recent literature on trade and
culture has shown that, even from an economic perspective, there can be argu-
ments for restricting imports of cultural goods. It is to these arguments that we
turn next.
2.2 Economic arguments for the protection of cultural goods
In China–Audiovisuals, China argued that reading materials and ﬁnished audio-
visual products are so-called ‘cultural goods’ and as such have a potentially
serious negative impact on public morals. Referring to the UNESCO Universal
Declaration on Cultural Diversity – which deﬁnes cultural goods as ‘vectors
of identity, values and meaning’ – China explained that cultural goods play
an essential role in the evolution and deﬁnition of elements such as societal fea-
tures, values, ways of living together, ethics, and behaviors. It then argued that
Table 2. Welfare eﬀects of a quota on cultural goods compared to free trade
Before China–Audiovisuals After China–Audiovisuals
Consumer surplus x(A+B+C+D) x(A+B+C+D)
Producer surplus +A +A
Quota rents + (C+G) 0
National welfare + G – (B+D) x(B+C+D)
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restrictions on cultural products are needed to prevent the dissemination of
cultural goods with a content that could have a negative impact on public morals
in China. The Panel and Appellate Body in China–Audiovisuals ultimately rejected
this defense, ﬁnding that China could pursue its censorship regime and the ‘public
morals’ it is allegedly protecting in a less-trade-restrictive manner, for example, by
letting the Chinese government itself do the censorship and then granting the right
to import the approved goods to all companies, be they Chinese or foreign, on a
nondiscriminatory basis.
Both the Panel and the Appellate Body simply ‘assumed’ that all of the censor-
ship by the Chinese government is driven by the need to protect ‘public morals’, an
assumption that is, given the above examples of censored content, not easy to
make. The Panel recalled that inUS–Gambling the term ‘public morals’ was found
to denote ‘standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a
community or nation’ and that ‘content of these concepts for Members can vary in
time and space, depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing social,
cultural, ethical and religious values’.47 Given the absence of US protest on the
matter, the Panel simply ‘assumed that each of the types of prohibited content in
China’s measures could, if it were brought into China, have a negative impact on
‘‘public morals’’ in China within the meaning of Article XX(a)’.48
While accepting the Panel’s ‘assumption’ on this question, the Appellate Body
had, however, a few pages earlier (in respect of another assumption that it found
unacceptable) stressed that assumptions may ‘not always provide a solid foun-
dation upon which to rest legal conclusions’ and ‘detract from a clear enunciation
of the relevant WTO law and create diﬃculties for implementation’.49 Indeed, now
that the Appellate Body found that China’s trading-rights restrictions are not
‘necessary’ to protect public morals because, as explained earlier, there are less-
trade-restrictive alternatives (e.g., the government rather than importers could do
the censorship), what if China now implements such alternative but still restricts
trading rights? Given that the Appellate Body merely ‘assumed’ that public morals
are at issue, nothing guarantees China that such less-trade-restrictive alternatives
would actually comply with Article XX.
China–Audiovisuals leaves open the question of whether the protection of
cultural goods can or should actually be justiﬁed under GATT/WTO rules. This is
the question that we address in the remainder of this section.50
47 Panel Report, China–Audiovisuals, para. 7.759, referring to Panel Report on United
States – Measures Aﬀecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R
(DSR 2005:XII, 5797), para. 6.465 and 6.461.
48 Appellate Body Report, China–Audiovisuals, para. 243, referring to Panel Report,
China–Audiovisuals, para. 7.763.
49 Appellate Body Report, China–Audiovisuals, para. 213.
50 China and the United States avoided arguments on this issue. Only Australia argued that ‘ in seeking
to rely on the public morals exception of Article XX(a), China needs to have demonstrated the contri-
bution the measure at issue brings to the achievement of its objective’ (Third Participant Submission of
Australia on 19 October 2009, page 6).
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For many years, concerns have been expressed about the possible detrimental
eﬀects of globalization on cultural diversity. In some countries, policymakers
have taken these concerns very seriously. For example, Canada and France have
implemented policies to prevent the possible loss of cultural identity that
might result from free trade. France has restrictions on foreign ﬁlms and television
programs from English-speaking countries, while Canada requires minimum levels
of Canadian content in radio and television broadcasts.
Does the economic literature support these concerns? In recent years, various
papers have attempted to model the eﬀects of trade on culture. In what follows, we
brieﬂy review some of the economic arguments developed in this literature to
justify the use of protectionist measures in the case of cultural goods.
Many of these theories develop the idea that consumers have heterogeneous
preferences and that an individual’s decision to consume foreign cultural goods
imposes a negative externality on other consumers. Below we will distinguish
between two classes of such models : those in which the externality is due to
increasing returns in the production of cultural goods, and those in which it is
directly built in consumers’ preferences.51
Economies of scale in the production of cultural goods
One of the ﬁrst papers to examine the link between trade and culture is by Francois
and van Ypersele (2002), who show that losses from trade may occur when cul-
tural goods are characterized by ﬁxed costs and heterogeneous valuations.
To ﬁx ideas, they describe a simple model of trade between two countries, de-
noted by France and the United States. Both countries can produce their ‘auteur’
(or locally ﬂavored) cinema, which is valued diﬀerentially by their own con-
sumers.52 In addition, the United States can produce Hollywood movies, a homo-
geneous good that is valued equally by all consumers in both countries. There are
important economies of scale in the movie industry: producers must sell enough
units, at relatively low marginal costs, to cover the high ﬁxed costs.
Trade leads to greater production of a ‘culturally homogeneous’ good at the
expense of culturally speciﬁc goods, since with the homogeneous good ﬁxed costs
can be spread out across countries. In their example, the Hollywood blockbuster
can drive out independent ﬁlms in both France and the United States. Depending
on parameters, trade restrictions on Hollywood movies may be Pareto improving
because it makes local movies viable in both markets.
The intuition for their result is that, if price discrimination is not possible (for
example, cinema tickets must, by law, be priced the same irrespective of the movie
watched), high consumer valuation cannot be captured in the heterogeneous case.
51 The emerging theoretical literature on trade and culture has some empirical work on this relation-
ship. See, for example, the paper by Disdier et al. (2010), which uses a long panel of French birth registries
to assess the link between foreign media and culture using name frequencies as a measure of tastes.
52 In the model by Francois and van Ypersele (2002), individuals are interested only in the local
movies produced in their own country.
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In contrast, the social beneﬁt of a homogeneously valued good can be eﬀectively
captured by the producers setting one price. This can lead to ineﬃciently low
production of the heterogeneous good, even when welfare would be higher with it.
The paper by Francois and van Ypersele (2002) demonstrates that restrictions
on trade of cultural goods (for instance by a tariﬀ or quota) can be welfare im-
proving. The two main assumptions that are required for their argument to hold
are: (1) cultural goods must be produced using increasing-returns-to-scale tech-
nologies ; (2) for some cultural goods, there is high variation in valuation amongst
consumers, while for others valuations are relatively homogeneous.
The authors argue that these conditions seem to be satisﬁed by the ﬁlm-industry
example, but possibly also by other cultural goods (for example radio and tele-
vision programming, literature, or print media). However, they also stress that
their analysis does not deﬁnitively favor protection over free trade in cultural
goods. It only suggests that protection may be justiﬁed when consumers have
heterogeneous tastes and cultural goods are produced under increasing returns to
scale.
Network externalities in the consumption of cultural goods
A second stream of the literature on trade and culture provides a rationale
for the protection of cultural goods based on the existence of consumption ex-
ternalities.
Seminal contributions to this literature are by Janeba (2004, 2007), who
formalizes the notion of cultural identity and incorporates it in a Ricardian model
of trade. To deﬁne culture, he adopts the ‘identity function’ of Akerlof and
Kranton (2000), whereby a person suﬀers a utility loss if some individuals in his
country deviate from social norms, and an individual who deviates from social
norms incurs a direct utility loss for the self-inﬂicted loss of identity.
In Janeba’s model, an individual’s utility for a cultural good is based in part on
how many others are also consuming it. He argues that consumers often
face the choice between diﬀerentiated products that are characterized by network
externalities. One notable example is the choice of a computer operating system.
Similarly, in the context of cultural goods people may have an additional beneﬁt
from consuming a certain good when others do the same. For example, watching a
movie when others see it as well allows consumers to share their experience.
This interdependence of preferences can be used to study how a country’s cul-
tural identity is aﬀected by trade liberalization. In this framework, ‘cultural goods
diﬀer from other goods in that they create an interdependence among individual
consumption decisions, like a network externality, and thus generate cultural
identity_ the more consumers buy the same good the lower is the loss in identity
for existing consumers and the more attractive becomes the consumption of such
good for other consumers ’ (Janeba, 2004: 25).
The analysis of Janeba points out that trade can be welfare reducing when a
country is culturally homogeneous. In particular, he shows that free trade is not
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always Pareto superior to autarky because individuals can suﬀer a negative ex-
ternality when others have diﬀerent consumption patterns.
Janeba studies the welfare eﬀects of trade openness on welfare for a given and
exogenous population of cultural agents.53 Olivier et al. (2008), on the other hand,
do not derive welfare results but focus on the impact of trade openness on
endogenous cultural identity. In particular, they highlight the disutility experi-
enced by the parent generation as their children adopt new cultures. In their model,
cultural identity comes as the outcome of a dynamic process of transmission of
preferences as micro-founded for instance by Bisin and Verdier (2000), in which
preferences of children are acquired through an adaptation and imitation process
that depends on their parents’ decisions and on the environment in which they live.
A dynamic analysis of culture is also presented in Bala and Van Long (2005).
They develop an evolutionary model of preferences in which cultural dynamics are
driven by an exogenous process directly imported from the Darwinian literature in
biology. They show that a large country may be able to overrun the indigenous
preferences of a smaller country through trade.
Where does this leave the WTO and possible exceptions based on culture or
cultural diversity? First, it must be noted that apart from GATT Article IV on
internal ﬁlm or screening quotas, there is no explicit cultural exception in the
GATT or GATS. Second, in China–Audiovisuals, the cultural exception was
channeled into GATT through the backdoor of ‘public morals’. However, no-
where under this exception of GATT Article XX(a) is reference made to any of the
criteria referred to in the economics literature. What matters under Article XX(a)
is whether the measure does, indeed, protect public morals and, if so, whether the
measure is ‘necessary’ to achieve its objective. Third, when it comes to China’s
censorship it is far from clear whether all of it is related to public morals, let alone
culture. Moreover, even to the extent that it is related to culture, further exam-
ination would be needed to see whether any of China’s measures are welfare en-
hancing. The only aim of the above survey is to indicate that, in some cases, and
under certain assumptions, trade restrictions on cultural goods can be welfare
enhancing and can, therefore, be justiﬁable.
3. Conclusions
No head-on collision occurred in China–Audiovisuals between, on the one hand,
free trade in cultural goods and services and, on the other hand, China’s censorship
regime. The main parties involved went to great pains to avoid such clash: China,
by only invoking GATT’s public-morals exception for Protocol violations (not for
GATT/GATS violations); the United States, by not contesting that all of the con-
tent prohibited by China harms ‘public morals’ ; and, ﬁnally, the Panel and
53 Rauch and Trindade (2009) extend Janeba’s setup and allow for imperfect competition and inno-
vation in the cultural sector.
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Appellate Body by simply assuming that China’s censorship does, indeed, promote
‘public morals’, without making a deﬁnitive ﬁnding on the matter.
In future disputes, governments may be required to justify the use of measures to
protect cultural goods. To do so, they may be able to use diﬀerent economic ar-
guments that have been developed in the recent literature on trade and culture,
which we have reviewed in Section 2.2 above. However, it is important to
stress that the arguments developed in this literature do not unambiguously favor
protection over free trade in cultural goods. They merely suggest that protection
may be justiﬁed when (a) consumers have heterogeneous preferences over cultural
goods and (b) there are economies of scale in the production and/or network
eﬀects in the consumption of cultural goods.
The Appellate Body’s ruling clariﬁed crucial questions on how to distinguish
between goods and services when it comes to today’s ‘content’ industry. For the
application of WTO rules on trade in ‘goods’ the Appellate Body focused on
whether Chinese restrictions have an eﬀect or impact on a material or physical
product, even if this tangible product was only a minor element in the economic
value of the transaction (e.g., a physical ﬁlm reel when it comes to movies). This
implies a technological bias requiring a physical product before WTO rules on
trade in goods can be applied (not, for example, when a ﬁlm is transferred over the
Internet). When it comes to services, in contrast, the Appellate Body approached
GATS in a technologically neutral fashion, covering under ‘distribution services’
both the physical transfer of CDs and distribution of music over the Internet. It
remains to be seen whether tangibility or material nature is a suﬃcient condition
for something to be a ‘good’ and whether it is, conversely, a necessary condition
(can intangible assets, such as IP, electricity, or ﬁlms over the Internet never be
‘goods’?).
The Appellate Body also conﬁrmed a general ‘right to regulate ’ (e.g., pursuant
to GATT Article XX) and found that the right to regulate what can be traded can,
in principle, excuse violations or restrictions on who can trade or import. The
exact scope of this ‘right to regulate’ and whether it must be explicitly referred to
in the text of WTO obligations remains unclear. It is sure to animate many WTO
disputes ahead.
Finally, the Appellate Body found that, even assuming that China’s censorship
regime promotes public morals, China’s approach of limiting the right to import
cultural goods to certain state-owned enterprises is not ‘necessary’ to protect
public morals since less-trade-restrictive alternatives are available – for example,
letting the Chinese government itself do the censorship and then granting the right
to import the approved goods to all companies, including US companies estab-
lished in China.
The ruling does not restrict censorship by the Chinese government and keeps the
existing quota on foreign movies in place. However, it allows producers to import
and distribute audiovisual products that pass China’s censorship without dis-
crimination. Even if their sales may be unaﬀected by the ruling, US producers can
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now obtain potentially large rents in the Chinese market. In addition, more
eﬃcient or transparent distribution by US companies (rather than state-owned
Chinese) may lead to more sales of particular imports that do pass China’s quotas
and censorship.
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